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Abstract
In this article I present an argument for the necessary co-articulation of meaning within our felt
enkinaesthetic engagement with our world. The argument will be developed through a series of
stages, the first of which will be an elaboration of the notion of articulation of and through the body.
This will be followed by an examination of enkinaesthetic experiential entanglement and the role it
plays in rendering our world meaningful and our actions values-realising. At this stage I will begin to
extend Husserl’s notion of intentional transgression to the enkinaesthetic sphere of lived experience,
and in support of this claim I will examine the theoretical and practical work of osteopathic manual
listening [Gens & Roche 2014] and the ‘felt sense’ in focusing [Gendlin] which makes possible a
shift from a somatic articulation to a semantic, and potentially conceptual, one. Throughout, my
position will be compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “Whenever I try to understand myself,
the whole fabric of the perceptible world comes too, and with it comes the others who are caught in
it.” [Merleau-Ponty 1964a, p.15].
Introduction
In a similar way to Merleau-Ponty [1962, 1964a, 1964b 1968 & 1970] my task will be to uncover, one
might even say elicit, the sensual layers of pre-theoretical living within our lifeworld or Lebenswelt.
Yet I go further than this; my central concern is with the articulation of a world of meaningful ex-
perience, created, in part, at least, by a process of prenoetic mutually transgressive affective neuro-
muscular entanglement; a great deal of the paper will be spent working towards a satisfactory account
of what is meant by this mutual transgression. At first blush it will seem paradoxical to use the term
‘articulation’ in the context of pre-reflective felt experience, for if that experience is pre-reflective,
it will be pre-conceptual, non-propositional, non-representational, and, we would imagine, incapable
of being articulated in the usual way we conceive of articulation. So, let’s begin by making clear
what will not be our concern: (i) the more usual uses of ‘articulation’ to mean the articulation of clear
sounds in speech, (ii) or the putting into words of a previously inchoate idea, or (iii) any notion of
articulation which is centred on the individual and potentially solipsistic. Whilst the first two are in-
teresting and have been the subject of sustained concern for centuries’ worth of the writings of others,
the third, I argue elsewhere [Stuart 2012], is specious and, what’s more, impossible. Thus, our much
more specific concern is with the articulation of meaning through and by the intentionally-saturated
activity of the living body in an affective community of other living bodies and things.1 It is a richly
1I have elsewhere, for example, Stuart 2010 & Stuart 2012, used the categories of ‘agential’ and ‘non-agential’, but given
Latour’s arguments for the action or participation of non-humans (‘actants’) within rhizomic-networks (see, for example, La-
tour 2005), I am content to construe the former as intentional, the latter as non-intentional, and both as significant, contributing
to the co-articulation of meaning, within a dynamic material-semiotic.
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affective, plenisentient community, characterised by the implicit intricacy of a pre-reflective neuro-
muscular entanglement through which we are the unthinking co-creators, that is, co-articulators of
our shared world.2 I will argue that this affective co-articulation is made possible by a condition of
our own subjectivity, and that this condition is a prenoetic somatosensory intentional transgression
of the living dynamic experiencing being of the other. Thus, I will argue, our lived experience is
always tempered by the direct spontaneous reception, or passive synthesis, of the experientially en-
tangled living being of the other as they transgress our own experience and we theirs. I will refer
to this as the enkinaesthetic community and reciprocity of our affective being with our world – our
Mitseinwelt, and it is our folding into, enfolding with, and unfolding from this community which is
the co-articulation of our shared meanings.
The most immediate question that arises is what is involved in this process of somatic, semantic and,
by no means necessarily, conceptual articulation; so, we will start by an elaboration of the notions
of articulation of and through the body, and then, through the articulated and articulating body, we
will reach out through our enkinaesthetic experiential entanglement with other living bodies to the
role that living, breathing, feeling bodies play in rendering our shared worlds meaningful and our
actions values-realising. In doing this I will extend Husserl’s notion of intentional transgression to the
enkinaesthetic sphere of lived experience, and in support of this claim I will examine the theoretical
and practical work of osteopathic manual listening [Gens & Roche], and the ‘felt sense’ in focusing
[Gendlin 1966, 1992, 1997 & 2015] which emphasises the possible shift from a somatic articulation
to a semantic one. Throughout the whole my position will be compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s claim
that
Whenever I try to understand myself, the whole fabric of the perceptible world comes
too, and with it comes the others who are caught in it. . . . For [others] are not fictions
with which I might people my desert–offspring of my spirit and forever unactualized
possibilities–but my twins or the flesh of my flesh. [Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.15]
Let’s start with a skeleton, put some living, breathing, sensing flesh on its bones, and then proceed,
by feeling our way towards an articulation of our twins, the flesh of our flesh.
Articulation
There is a character, Mr Venus, in Charles Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend, whose employ is as an
articulator of bones, someone who reconstructs the skeleton of animals, including human animals,
and who occasionally extends their skills to taxidermy, that is, making the animal appear as though it
still has flesh on its bones. Mr Venus, who possesses the amputated leg of his interlocutor, Mr Wegg,
exclaims that:
[I]f you was brought here loose in a bag to be articulated, I’d name your smallest
bones blindfold equally with your largest, as fast as I could pick ‘em out, and I’d sort
‘em all, and sort your wertebræ, in a manner that would equally surprise and charm you.
[Chp. VII, p.64]
It’s a vivid passage, not least because of the ironic suggestion that Mr Wegg would be around to be
delighted by Mr Venus’s remarkable feats of reassembly when he has re-articulated his bones, but
also for the ease and skill with which Mr Venus makes sense of a skeletal world so familiar to his
touch, to his vision, to his life-world. Each of the bones, even the smallest, has significance for, that
is, has meaning and matters to, Mr Venus. Through his affective acquaintance he would be able to re-
articulate and make sense of Mr Wegg’s frame, with each of the individual bones articulating where
2None of this is to imply that there is no cognitive activity going on, there may be, there may not; and nor is it to suggest
that there is no linguistic community, there may well be; it is merely to suggest that this is not the concern of this current paper.
2
they meet, in the microcosm of their intertwinings. A single bone is inarticulate, yet in Mr Venus’s
hands it has meaning, it is a value-object, and with Mr Venus’s intervention and in conjunction with
other bones, all value-objects, its complex social meanings are articulated. Their articulation can be
described in functional terms as permitting this or that extent of movement, this or that orientation,
these or those degrees of freedom, as having single or multiple axes of movement, and as having flat,
concave or convex surfaces, but more importantly their articulation is hermeneutic, making sense and
giving voice to the individually unintelligible or incoherent. Mr Venus, as an articulator of bones, is
a re-creator of worlds of meaning, where the elements act not as isolated individuals free from any
impingement on others, and where the sense of affecting change and being affected brings forth, that
is, articulates worlds for the multiplicity of unions. Such unions are not simplified dyadic interactions,
and not only for Mr Venus. The whole, including Mr Wegg and beyond, is massively polyadic,
consisting not just of other living beings and things, but also memories, utterances, and events, past,
present and future, all of which matter or have significance for us because they affect us and alter
us, and in this universal dialogue we affect and alter them. It is within this affective community and
reciprocity we feel our way in a co-articulated values-realising co-constituting dynamics.
Yet, for all this, the world of meaning that Mr Venus re-creates cannot yet be our ‘twin’ in the way
Merleau-Ponty implies. To be our ‘twin’ Mr Wegg’s skeleton must have feeling and sensing flesh on
its bones, and this would have to comprise some part of its neurodynamical enkinaesthetic ability to
feel the givenness and ownership of its own experience as entwined with the living feeling breathing
dynamical being of other living beings and things. Only if this is the case can our ‘twin’ be affected
and altered, can it sense and anticipate, and only if this is the case can it reciprocate in a co-articulation
of meaning and value. So let’s examine in a little more detail what Merleau-Ponty might mean when
he says that others are not fictions, that they are the flesh of my flesh; to do this we’ll explore the
notion of articulation through the lens of enkinaesthetic theory.
Enkinaesthetic Co-Articulation
There are three characteristics of enkinaesthetic theory which are crucial for this paper. The first is
that there exists between us and other agents a prosody of resonance and fragmentation, in the form of
interpersonal felt cadences that are “regulated by emotions of affection and enjoyment, expressed and
given meaningful form by rhythms of modulated movement” [Malloch & Trevarthen 2009, p.2]. The
second is that, through our actions and perceptions we inhabit the other’s experience, which is to say
that there exists an immanent intercorporeality in the prosody of our neuro-muscular entanglement.
This notion is similar to Husserl’s notion of Paarung, but we will also see that it is profoundly
different. And, the third feature arises as an interplay of the first and second, for in that interplay
we don’t just enact and articulate our own meanings, we also bring forth, that is, articulate others’
meaning. So, just as Varela claims about an object, that it is not ‘out there’ independently, but “arises
because of your activity, so, in fact, you and the object are co-emerging, co-arising” [Varela 1999,
pp.71-72], I claim that the co-articulation of meaning arises out of our enkinaesthetic co-emerging,
co-arising. We’ll proceed by examining these aspects in more detail.
Trevarthen observes that “There is an old and frequently rediscovered understanding that we come
alive as subjects or persons only in relation with others, by [our] being innately sensitive to their
actions toward us”3; I would add, and their being innately – and synchronously – sensitive to our
actions towards them, for only with that co-responsiveness can we feel the other as immanent in
our own being. Enkinaesthetic theory is a further rediscovery of this understanding, but it is also
a development of it, bringing with it a means of drawing together how we articulate our concerns
and the concerns of others within the sensitive community and reciprocity of living being, where
each action, already characterised by its givenness and a saturated intentionality, engenders affect
and that affect engenders action, not just within ourselves but within all life. Thus, it is through our
3This is from an early draft of a paper sent in personal correspondence. It is worth noting that in that paper Trevarthen
refers to Hutcheson 1755, Smith 1759, Buber 1937, Macmurray 1961, and Reddy 2008 who each make this ‘rediscovery’ from
fascinating perspectives.
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enkinaesthetic entanglement that we experience the intercorporeal resonances, and the fractures and
fragmentation of resonances, with those agents with whom, and those objects with which, we are in
a perpetual community of reciprocal relations, within the experiential repertoire of the whole. As
Sperry says “The experience of the organism is integrated, organised, and has its meaning in terms
of coordinated movement.” [Sperry 1939, p.295], but Sperry is too cautious and fails to mention that
movement is affectively coordinated with the energic pitches, cadences, and tempos that characterise
our polyphonic intertwining with other organisms and things [Stuart & Thibault 2015].
Communication between similarly motivated and similarly formed subjects, with the
same kind of brain and the same rhythms and forms of attending, evidently has evolved
by brains taking up and engaging with – or resonating to – the timing, aim, and style
of these intentional and sense-directed activities generated in other brains. [Trevarthen
2009, p.12] 4
Without embracing Trevarthen’s emphasis on the brain, I am claiming that this communication is
a natural, direct and unmediated apprehension of the other’s experience in our own. This is not to
say that our experience of the other’s experience is from their perspective; that would be absurd.
It is to say that when Merleau-Ponty speaks of others as real in our experience, as the flesh of my
flesh, he is claiming that the other is ‘always “already there” [in my experience] before reflection
begins’ [Merleau-Ponty 1970, p.65], and that it is an always already there as the ‘primordial being
which is not yet the subject-being nor the object-being’ (Merleau-Ponty 1970: 65). In this way, in
the day-to-dayness of the community and reciprocity of our affective Mitseinwelt we need neither to
develop and implement some conjectural cognitive theory about the mind of the other, nor to perform
some curious simulation of what the other might be thinking if we were them, and neither of these
is required because we routinely transgress our own bodily boundaries spilling over into, that is,
pervading the plenisentient bodily experience of the other, and they ours.
[A]t the same time the other who is to be perceived is himself not a “psyche” closed
in on himself, but rather a conduct, a system of behavior that aims at the world, he offers
himself to my motor intentions and to that “intentional transgression” (Husserl) by which
I animate and pervade him. [Merleau-Ponty 1964b, p.118]
Husserl argues that, through a process of corporeal analogising, by which he means recognising the
other as having a body similar to our own, we co-present the other and understand it to be, not simply
a body like an object, Ko¨rper, but as being an ‘ensouled’, psychic, or living body, Leib.5 Analogising
in this way couples ego and alter ego as Paarung, where the other, as psychically distinct from me, is,
nevertheless, appresented as Leib. The emphasis for Husserl is on the auditory and visual perception
of the other as having a moving, kinaesthetic body like my own, and it is in this observation that an
‘intentional transgression’ occurs, and I spontaneously appresent the other as another ego, an alter
ego. Merleau-Ponty also emphasises the role of visual perception saying:
Husserl said that the perception of others is like a “phenomenon of coupling” (accouple-
ment). The term is anything but a metaphor. In perceiving the other, my body and his
are coupled, resulting in a sort of action which pairs them (action a` deux). This conduct
which I am able only to see, I live somehow from a distance. I make it mine; I recover
(reprendre) it or comprehend it. [ibid.]
4Marvellous examples of this affective coordination are given in Validation Therapy, see: https://vfvalidation.
org/web.php?request=index especially the validation breakthrough with Gladys Wilson https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=CrZXz10FcVM
5The anomalous counter-factual cases of, for example, antisocial personality disorders, including psychopathy and sociopa-
thy (DSM-5 301.7), of depersonalisation or derealisation disorders (DSM-5 300.6), of Cotard’s delusion (DSM-5 297.1), and
of Capgras syndrome, reveal our co-presentation of the other as Leib to be the non-anomalous one might say, natural, everyday
response to other human beings. All references from DSM-5 2013.
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Enkinaesthetic theory takes the intentional transgression further beyond Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s
conceptions, arguing that visual and corporeal analogising plays only a greatly diminished role in our
grasp of the intentional arc of the other’s current and future action, and that the ‘alter’ ego that we
appresent whilst remaining visually other, is not affectively other; this appresented other is already
there in its primordiality. We have no need for analogising the physical body with our own, recog-
nising it as similar, and switching to seeing it as a living being. We are always already within the
perpetual felt community and reciprocity of an enkinaesthetic field, where “field” refers to the domain
within which a particular condition prevails – in this case a topologically complex, affectively-laden,
intentionally-saturated Mitseinwelt of other beings and things. We dwell within our plenisentient
intersubjective engagement with other agents, human and non-human, and this dwelling, this entan-
gled enkinaesthetic experience, is a transcendental condition for the prenoetic affect, which makes
alter ego identification, co-presentation, co-articulation, and co-action possible.6 In these massively
polyadic enkinaesthetic intertwinings, the simultaneous experience of our affect on others and their
affect on us has an immanence in our being; we are, at one and the same time, both subject and object,
and object not just in the gaze of the other, but also in our own sensed reflection in our memory, and
in our anticipatory framing of ourselves within horizons of current and future possibilities.
In a phrase redolent of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘chiasm’, Young (1980) uses “ambiguous transcendence” to
describe the experiential inseparability of our being, at one and the same time, both subject and object;
the dynamics of such a crisscrossing or ‘intertwining’ of the “touching [subject] and the tangible
[object]”, are fundamental for the success of living organisms within the enkinaesthetic field.7
This can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is also accessible from
without, itself tangible, for my other hand, for example, if it takes its place among the
things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens finally upon a tangible being of which
it is also a part. Through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its
own movements incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate, are recorded
on the same map as it . . . [Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p.133]
There is here no problem of the alter ego because it is not I who sees, not he who sees,
because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that
primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here and now, of radiating everywhere
and forever, being an individual, of being also a dimension and a universal. [ibid., p.142]
It is in this way, through the everywhere and forever radiation of resonances and fragmentations
within our enkinaesthetic chiasm, that we bring forth, that is, co-articulate our, that is, collectively
‘our’, world. And, in this way, our ‘own’ world can never be brought forth or articulated, without
the worlds of all others being brought forth or being articulated too; they are always already within
our own articulation, immanent and never fully transcendent. Thus we are, at one and the same time,
prenoetically a universal non-individuated being, and noetically (and visually) individuated.
All that I’ve said here is consistent with the direct perception theory8 [Chemero 2006 & Gallagher
2008] proposed as an alternative to theory-theory [Carruthers & Smith 1996] and simulation-theory
[Davies & Stone 1995] as the means by which we understand what is in another’s mind. There is
something so remarkably cumbersome about having to first establish a theory, in some third-person
6There is no opportunity in this current paper to do justice to the claim that there exist, and indeed that there must exist,
intra- and inter-species enkinaesthetic resonances and fragmentations. In this regard I wholeheartedly commend to the reader
Chapter 3, “Affect Attunement, Discourse Ethics Across Species”, of Willett’s Interspecies Ethics.
7An alternative, not a counter-, example from nature might be an animal which can simultaneously be both predator and
prey. Weasels prey on smaller mammals like mice and voles, but they are also prey for larger predators like foxes and owls;
and fish are nearly all piscivorous which means that they eat fish but they are also likely to be eaten by larger fish. In both
these cases weasel and fish are likely to be simultaneously the subject of their experience and aware that they might also be
the object of the other’s experience; they are both the touching and the tangible.
8That enkinaesthetic entanglement is consistent with direct perception theory does not imply agreement with or acceptance
of that theory. Direct perception is fine as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go far enough. Enkinaesthesia offers immanence,
experiential transgression, extended body theory, and co-articulation, all of which take direct perception into new territory.
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scientific manner, about what another may be thinking, or having to place myself rather awkwardly
and time-consumingly in the other’s ‘shoes’, so that I can have a first-person experience of the world
from ‘their’ perspective, that makes one wonder why these theories have remained credible for so
long. I am not here denying that there are occasions when the situation is massively complicated
and I have to judge whether or not I am, for example, being deceived by a smile or humoured by an
agreement, but in general this kind of judgement is made post hoc through some reflective analysis;
however, crucially, the felt sense we have of doubting the sincerity of an interaction relies on our
prenoetic openness to the radiating resonances and fragmentations within our enkinaesthetic chiasm.
This too is consistent with Gibson’s ecological approach to perceptual experience, the first tenet
of which is that perception is direct and not for adding information to sensations; the second is
that perception is for action guidance, not information gaining; and the third is that perception is of
affordances, the action possibilities within a perceptual horizon. Within this horizon, which is, first
and foremost, an enkinaesthetic, intentionally-saturated affective horizon “organism and environment
enfold into each other and unfold from one another in the fundamental circularity [the enkinaesthetic
community and reciprocity of co-articulation] that is life itself”.9 [Varela, Rosch, & Thompson 1991,
p.217]
Gendlin’s process model [1966, 1992, 1997, & 2015] provides a means of elaborating this experiential
enfolding and unfolding within what he refers to as the implicit intricacy of the organism’s body-
environment felt sense. I will provide a short summary of Gendlin’s work10 and then offer a practical
extension of it through the technique of osteopathic manual listening [Sutherland; Gens & Roche
2014]. In this work we have an example of the naturally occurring co-articulation of meaning within
the spontaneous enkinaesthetic appresentation of the other’s experience in mine, in my experience in
the other’s.
The Felt Sense in Focusing and Osteopathic Manual Listening
The ‘implicit’ has to be felt in the body, but it is not only inside the body. Rather, it
consists of body-environment interaction. “Interaction” comes first. Interaction has al-
ways already happened, even when we think about a separate environment and a separate
body. [Gendlin 2015]11
One way in which we might begin to think about the implicit is as the givenness immanent in our
experience. At first glance, this might seem sufficient, but it has echoes of individuation, as though it
were somehow possible to separate the givenness of the individual’s experience from its experiential
situatedness and the community and reciprocity of our being with other living bodies and things. And,
it isn’t just an ‘implicit’, it is an “implicit intricacy”, and an “implicit interactional bodily intricacy”
which characterises the proto-modal relationships of organisms in the practical everydayness of their
lived being. In this way we might develop our understanding along enkinaesthetic lines, so that the
“implicit intricacy” which is always already there too is our prenoetic enkinaesthetic experiential
entanglement.
There is an implicit interactional bodily intricacy that is first – and still with us now. It is
not the body of perception that is elaborated by language, rather it is the body of inter-
actional living in its environment. . . . We sense our bodies not as elaborated perceptions
but as the body sense of our situations, the interactional whole-body by which we orient
and know what we are doing. [Gendlin 1992, p.352]
9Bracketed phrase my addition.
10For a detailed account of the Process Model start here: http://www.focusing.org/process.html
11We might say that interaction is primary, but it would be no more true for Gendlin’s model than it would be true to say
it of relation in Leibniz’s monadology [Leibniz 1991]; the existence of interaction or relation (respectively) presupposes a
multiplicity of entities: bodies, monads, consciousnesses, depending on the ontological commitments of your system. What
each model shares or, at least seems to share, is the implicit intricacy with which all things are interwoven. In each it is through
consciousness, in each it is relational, in Gendlin’s it is also interactional.
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Gendlin’s “Implicit intricacy” permeates the enkinaesthetic field, folding into, enfolding with, and
unfolding from all things within a vast polyadic affective living landscape of articulating and co-
articulating microcosmic intertwinings. Conceived thus, living being, Leib, transcends individual
bodies and agents within this intricate enkinaesthetic web. As Gendlin says: “nature is an implicit
intricacy” [Gendlin 1997, p.347], implying, I will add, but I do not anticipate that Gendlin would
disagree, the co-articulation of meaning within a values-realising non-individuated being. This dyna-
mic Gendlin refers to as a “situational understanding”, a kind of animal somatic grasp, and it has
an ontological and experiential primacy to the “felt sense” that arises and pervades the co-activity or
co-articulation of the organism-environment.
If an animal hears a noise, many situations and behaviors will be implicit in its sense
of the noise, places to run to, types of predators, careful steps, soundless moves, turning
to fight, many whole sequences of behavior. Meanwhile the animal stands still, just
listening. What it will do is not determined. Surely it won’t do all the implicit sequences
– perhaps not even one of just these but some subtler response . . . [Gendlin 1997, Chp.
II, p. 7]
All living being in its implicit intricacy exists in this way within an enkinaesthetic field of affective
enquiry and action. The implicit intricacy of “felt sensing” in its “situational understanding” is the
articulation and co-articulation of non-propositional, pre-reflective, pre-conceptual, plenisentient in-
terpretation, anticipation, and communication; all of which takes place within a horizon of action
possibilities and comes already laden with the implicit non-propositional questions “how is my world
now?”, “how is it . . . becoming?”. The plenisentient responses to these questions pervade the agent
and perpetuate a continuously unfolding fresh horizon of action possibilities. It is this which con-
stitutes the ‘knowing’ referred to by Gendlin, a ‘knowing’ which occurs in natural agents through
an enkinaesthetic affective enfolding which enables the balance and counter-balance, the attunement
and co-ordination of whole-body action through mutual reciprocal adaptation.
A felt sense of this kind cannot arise through our thinking ourselves into directing our attention to-
wards an already existing object, as though somehow we are naturally cognitively and connatively
separable from them, perceiving them in a successive order and even through distinct individuated
senses; to do this is to immediately think ourselves out of an enkinaesthetic co-articulation of mean-
ing, out into the alien world of propositional attitudes and body-environment-independent minds. For
a felt sense we must proceed ‘feelingly’, [Gloucester in King Lear, Act 4, Scene VI] for only then
can we articulate a somatic sense of our situation with its openness to action possibilities, and only
then can we hope to experience a “felt shift” to a more distinctive semantic articulation.
“Thinking with the implicit” is a means of producing a felt sense or somatic articulation of something
that possesses a semantics but which may not yet have words. “As it forms, the ”feel” understands
itself, so to speak.”12 [Gendlin 1997, p.216] The practice of focusing is characterised by enquiry and
action, but not necessarily dynamic physical action in the form of movement of the body or limbs;
rather it is an attempt to render articulable that which is felt, possibly only inchoately. Focusing is an
act of values-realising in seeking though not striving, waiting without the intrusion of impatience or
irritation, and an openness to letting a feeling come, and brought with it is a bodily sense of the fit or
value of the feeling; in this way, in the community and reciprocity of the enquiry and anticipation, the
inchoate begins to take shape. Gendlin says it has a feeling of “rightness or wrongness” [ibid. p.219],
but in using any of these terms, ‘fit’, ‘value’, “rightness or wrongness” it must also be remembered
that their aptness is not at the level of cognitive judgement, but at the level of how they sit within the
body. We might think of finding the fit as akin, in some way, to the “a ha” moment that comes when
we think “Now I understand.”, “Now I know how to go on.” [Wittgenstein 1958, ¶323], except that
the accompaniment to the implicit fit is not a proposition but a prenoetic feeling or body-environment
grasp. “A Felt Sense is a distinctly felt object which may now form and come as a bodily-felt “this””
12“So to speak” is such an odd metaphor to use in this context where the central concern is with prenoetic somatic affection
and its felt semantic articulation, and not with conceptualisation, judgement and verbalisation. But the phrase is in fairly
common use to mean that the words, “the “feel” understands itself”, are being used in a non-standard way.
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[Gendlin 2015, fn 5], where ‘this’ has a growing clarity as a referent with an unfolding sense. We
might refer to this unfolding sense as a process of interoception or intrasubjective enquiry, but that
would be to fail to recognise and acknowledge the implicit intricacy of the enkinaesthetic body-
environment as a condition for the articulation of meaning within an organism’s horizons of current
and future possibilities.
We will now examine the practice of osteopathic manual listening where we can find evidence of
just such an unfolding sense, with its shift from a somatic to a semantic bodily-felt ‘this’.13 In
addition, because the technique provides an express articulation of enkinaesthetic entanglement, we
have a practical corroboration of the co-articulation of a bodily-felt ‘this’ which is immanent in our
enkinaesthetic intentional transgression of and intertwining within the other’s experience and in theirs
within ours.14
Just as with traditional osteopathy, osteopathic listening is a practice which uses the hands, but unlike
traditional osteopathy the hands are not used to manipulate the patient’s body; instead the therapist’s
hands are the focal point of a synaesthetic listening-feeling process, the gentle touch – and even
non-touch – of palpation, listening for rhythms and arhythms. Just as in focusing, there is, in the
listening process, a seeking without striving, a waiting without impatience, and an openness to what
presents itself, all of which can occur, in this non-traditional osteopathic method, without needing
to be in constant tactile contact with the patient’s body, and even without touching it directly at
all. It is the non-necessity for touch which makes this form of osteopathic listening particularly
intriguing, and especially because of its appreciation for the routine enkinaesthetic transgression of
our bodily boundaries in which we pervade the plenisentient bodily experience of the other. In other
words, osteopathic manual listening embraces the ambiguous transcendence of the everydayness of
our folding into, enfolding with, and unfolding from the other within the processual co-articulation
of our shared meanings.
The defining characteristic of this listening process is that it essentially derives from the
osteopath’s ability to sense the inner space in which organic life develops – in other
words, to sense this organic life itself, even though we are raised to believe that such a
perception is impossible.
The common view is that, without using a scalpel, it is as impossible for us to have a
knowledge of the interior life inside a living organism enveloped in skin as it is for us to
see through a wall. [Gens & Roche 2014, p.2]
The view that this perception is impossible is based on all manner of things including, but not limited
to, the visual opacity of the appearance of the body,15 but whilst vision may accompany manual
listening, it is by no means necessary for the felt immanence of the other’s experience in our own. The
process is first and foremost an enkinaesthetic intertwining, a circle of the touched and the touching
and what comes to light, that is, what is brought forth through the feeling shifting somatic sense.16
13See, for example, William G Sutherland.
14For another example of enkinaesthetic intentional transgression of and intertwining within the other’s experience see
Stuart 2013 “The Union of Two Nervous Systems: Neurophenomenology, Enkinaesthesia, and the Alexander Technique”.
15The particular historical and cultural treatments of individuals as separable from communities in possession of distinctive
souls has also played an important role. See, for example, Benedict’s distinction between ‘guilt’ societies and ‘shame’ societies.
[Benedict 1989]
16Another example of the feeling shifting somatic sense and its enkinaesthetic co-articulation is given in Steinbeck’s short
story The Chysanthemums [Steinbeck 1952] where the protagonist Elisa explains, to a travelling salesman, the sensitive pal-
pating, enquiring and acting, touch of “planting hands”.
“Did you ever hear of planting hands?”
“Can’t say I have, ma am.”
“Well, I can only tell you what it feels like. It’s when you’re picking off the buds you don’t want. Everything
goes right down into your fingertips. You watch your fingers work. They do it themselves. You can feel how it
is. They pick and pick the buds. They never make a mistake. They’re with the plant. Do you see? Your fingers
and the plant. You can feel that, right up your arm. They know. They never make a mistake. You can feel it.
When you’re like that you can’t do anything wrong. Do you see that? Can you understand that?”
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There is a circle of the touched and the touching, the touched takes hold of the touching;
there is a circle of the visible and the seeing, the seeing is not without visible existence;
there is even an inscription of the touching in the visible, of the seeing in the tangible
– and the converse; there is finally a propagation of these exchanges to all the bodies
of the same type and of the same style which I see and touch – and this by virtue of
the fundamental fission or segregation of the sentient and the sensible which, laterally,
makes the organs of my body communicate and founds transitivity from one body to
another.” [Merleau-Ponty 1968, p.143]
It is most unfortunate that Merleau-Ponty makes a ‘virtue’ “of the fundamental fission or segregation
of the sentient and the sensible”, for it is exactly that which is being contested in manual listening, in
focusing, and in the enkinaesthetic co-articulation of meaning which is possible precisely because of
our ambiguous transcendence. In the former two cases, osteopathic manual listening and focusing,
there must be a development of silence and openness in the psychic life of the practitioner, one in
which the continuous chatter and play of words and images must be quieted, and once this quiet is
established a felt sense of the other’s bodily experience is brought forth. In this somatic awareness to
receptivity a conscious, yet still somatic, co-articulation is forming, and “As it forms, the ”feel” un-
derstands itself” [Gendlin 1997, p.216], it shifts and, with a growing clarity, becomes a referent with a
continuously unfolding sense, and so on until another felt shift occurs and the co-articulated meaning
alters again. Throughout this process of openness and manual listening the experience of the partic-
ipants is of a between, neither subject nor object. As an enkinaesthetically co-articulated ambiguous
transcendence it is neither one nor other, but instead a prenoetically universal non-individuated being
which brings with it the whole fabric of the perceptible world as its twin, the flesh of its flesh.
Conclusion
So, finally let’s return to Mr Venus, who would have been able to surprise and charm Mr Wegg
by re-articulating his skeleton, making sense of the individual unintelligible bones in the polyadic
microcosms of their numerous intertwinings. We have begun to understand how Mr Venus could
articulate this aspect of his world blindfold; his fingers and hands, in their enkinaesthetic enquiry
and action, seeking, waiting, and letting come what arises somatically in the manual listening of his
habitual trade. He feels for the extension, smoothness, concavity or convexity of the bones, and their
somatic feel becomes a semantic felt sense, a felt ‘this’ which comes without conceptual interruption;
as Gendlin would say: their feel understands itself; as I would say: their feel is an enkinaesthetically
articulated grasp of a possibility of being. He works not just in the current moment but proceeds
feelingly, anticipatingly within horizons of possibilities.
But this is to do with the articulation of bones, and our concern is with the co-articulation of felt mean-
ing as outlined in the ambiguous transcendence of osteopathic manual listening, or in the practice of
partnered focusing, or in the reciprocity and community of Leib-Leib enkinaesthetic entanglement.
For that kind of affective co-articulation we needed to put feeling and sensing flesh on Mr Wegg’s
bones. With flesh on his bones he becomes Mr Venus’s ‘twin’ once more and he too can proceed
feelingly, trying to understand themselves and articulate their own meanings and values, and each
bringing the other, and the whole fabric of their perceptible world, with them too.
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